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A CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL TAX POLICY
CRITIQUES (OR, YOU’VE GOT TO SPEAK
OUT AGAINST THE MADNESS)∗
Leo P. Martinez∗∗
ABSTRACT
Critical tax scholarship is not universally embraced. This is a surprising
observation given that the premise underlying critical tax scholarship is simple, and—
if one aspires to intellectual honesty—should be uncontroversial. The premise is that
subpopulations of taxpayers are treated differently. This raises a significant
impediment toward achieving distributional equity. If distributional equity is a worthy
goal, then the question posed by critical tax scholars is whether the Internal Revenue
Code, in whole or by operation of individual provisions, achieves that salutary
purpose.
In this piece, I map out some of the critiques of critical tax theory. My primary
aim is to encourage a more thoughtful dialogue with respect to how we view taxes and
how taxes affect significant subpopulations of taxpayers. At a minimum, this article
will argue that there are inherent inequities in the Code that deserve our attention. My
secondary aim is that in mapping out the flaws in the critiques of critical tax theory,
those who pursue critical tax theory will be amply prepared to respond to their critics.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38QJ77Z3F
∗ The reference, for those who are not aging rockers (or fans of folk-rock), is from Crosby, Stills
& Nash’s album by the same name. David Crosby, Long Time Gone, on Crosby, Stills, & Nash (Atlantic
Records 1969).
∗∗ Albert Abramson Professor of Law, U.C., Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
Professor Neil H. Buchanan of The George Washington University School of Law for his invitation to
present this paper at the June 2017 Law & Society Annual Meeting in Mexico City and I am grateful for the
constructive comments made by the participants in that meeting. In particular, I want to thank Professor
Heather Field, Professor Michael Olivas, Dean Kevin Johnson, Dean Nancy Staudt, Professor Gregg D.
Polsky, Professor Anthony C. Infanti, and Professor Alice G. Abreu for their collective wisdom in shaping
this article. I am also grateful for the able research assistance of Nicole L. Bizzarri (U.C. Hastings, Class of
2019) and Karl Johnston (U.C. Hastings, Class of 2019). Finally, I am grateful for the sharp editorial eye of
Andrew Palma (U.C. Hastings, Class of 2018). Despite the valuable help, errors creep in. Those are mine.A
second acknowledgement is apt. My career was guided by the sage advice and friendship of Professor
Miguel Angel Mendez Longoria who passed away much too soon on May 25, 2017. His voice is reflected
in this piece just as it was in our joint work in this Journal in Toward A Statistical Profile of Latinos in the
Legal Profession, 13 La Raza L.J. 59 (2002), which we presented at the U.C. Berkeley, School of Law in
October 2001. As he always said “I am often asked for a word of advice by my Latino students and other
students of color. My reply over the years has been the same. We are overrepresented only among the poor
and the incarcerated. Whatever you choose to do with your law degree, just make sure that you leave the
door you enter through a little wider for those who follow.” My hope is that I have captured his spirit in this
article.
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INTRODUCTION
Professor Ed McCaffery succinctly stated that “tax affects each of us every
day.” 1 As such, it behooves us to pay attention to the effects our tax system has on our
constitutional democracy. 2 Our tax system should not create distinct winners and
losers. Furthermore, to the extent the winners and losers are racial and ethnic
minorities, we have an obligation to point out the injustice. We have to be willing to
recognize that a discriminatory Internal Revenue Code (Code) causes real harm. 3
Critical tax scholarship does exactly that. It “fills a gap in the traditional tax
discourse by providing ‘serious consideration of how the tax system exacerbates
marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated groups.’” 4 The premise
is that subpopulations of taxpayers are treated differently—raising the significant
problem of distributional equity. If distributional equity is a worthy goal, the question
posed by critical tax scholars is whether the Code or individual Code provisions
achieve that salutary purpose. Given that the premise underlying critical tax
scholarship is simple and—if one aspires to intellectual honesty—uncontroversial, it

1. Edward J. McCaffery, Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO L.J. 71, 72 (1996).
2. Karen B. Brown, Mary L. Fellows & Bridget J. , The Past, Present, and Future of Critical
Tax Theory: A Conversation, 10 PITT. TAX REV. 59, 65 (2012). Even “law professors view the study of tax
primarily as a technical exercise and fail to appreciate the role of tax in our society.” Id.
3. See e.g., Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. U. L. REV.
575, 577 (2001) (“Although tax systems operate less directly than civil rights systems in determining the
well-being of an individual or group, an individual or group which is taxed disproportionately suffers an
injury that is not unlike the injury suffered by an individual or group denied access to employment.”).
4. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 1191, 1194 n.10 (2008).
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is surprising that critical tax scholarship is not universally embraced. 5
As I have noted in previous scholarship, 6 it was long ago questioned whether
critics of the Code’s fairness were too narrow and purposely taking a selective view
through examination of only those Code provisions that advanced a particular point of
view. 7 A Pavlovian metaphor neatly captured this sentiment: “Within the critical tax
movement, there is a reward for examining a tax provision and finding it guilty of
hidden discrimination; there is no reward for discovering a provision is innocent.” 8
In this piece, I map out some of the critiques of critical tax theory. My primary
aim is to encourage a more thoughtful dialogue with respect to how scholars view
taxes and how taxes affect subpopulations of taxpayers. My secondary aim is to amply
prepare those who follow my path to respond to their critics using my map of flaws in
these critiques. At a minimum, my reward, using the Pavlovian metaphor, will be to
encourage scholars to be aware of the inherent inequities the Code enables.
Part I explains why the distributional equity of the Code deserves our
attention. Part II discusses several criticisms of critical tax theory and their
shortcomings. Lastly, Part III outlines some approaches for dealing with the Code’s
inequities.

I.

WHY THIS DESERVES OUR ATTENTION

At the threshold, is it a worthwhile endeavor to question the distributional
equity of the Code? If the answer is yes, then why has there been so little critical
examination of the criticism of critical tax theory in the last twenty years? 9 Both of
these inquiries are explained and addressed below.
A. Basic Justice
Three classic foundational pillars of tax policy are equity, efficiency, and ease
of administration. 10 This piece focuses on the first pillar, equity. In particular, it
5. See James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Critics, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1688
(1998); Charles O. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously—A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1749
(1998) (“[T]o meet the criticisms of feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes a nightmare of dilemmas
that are just not resolvable.”); Erik Jensen, Critical Tax Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Profession,
76 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (1998) (suggesting that critical tax theory is couched in “loaded, offputting
language”). One commentator captures this sentiment: “Lower-income, middle-income, or higher-income
African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, or other groups all struggle with the human
predicament. To try to solve particular problems through the Internal Revenue Code would present a
daunting challenge no lawmaker should or could take on.” Galvin, supra note 5, at 1752.
6. Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal Revenue Code and Latino Realities:
A Critical Perspective, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 386–87 (2011).
7. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1522–
23 (1998).
8. Id. at 1578. In singling out Professor Zelenak, I mean no disrespect. On the contrary, I view
his work as a must-read for any tax professor, and it is the clarity, precision, and erudition of his work that
invites my foray into this largely uncharted area. Moreover, Professor Zelenak was not necessarily
predisposed to dismiss critical tax scholarship, rather a major thrust of his criticism recognized the
importance of the subject and his upset was his view that some of the scholarship is not carefully done. Id.
at 1523.
9. But see Infanti, supra note 4; Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy
Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004) (Professor Anthony Infanti has been a notable exception).
10. Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y
206, 209 (2014); Infanti, supra note 4, at 1192 (defining this principle as “tax equity”—stating that “we
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focuses on distributional equity. While distributional equity is multi-faceted, there are
a number of approaches that incorporate race and ethnicity as relevant avenues of
inquiry. This type of approach is based on income level. To the extent that low-income
levels correlate with a taxpayer’s race or ethnicity, the appropriate inquiry is whether
any tax imposed could be structured in a way as to avoid racial and ethnic disparities.
A second approach to distributional equity is based on wealth. 11 To the extent
that low wealth levels correlate with a taxpayer’s race or ethnicity, the question is
whether any tax imposed could be structured to avoid racial and ethnic disparities.
Finally, distinct from income and wealth inquiries, I discuss how the
complexities of race and ethnicity subtly add to the effects of tax policy on a particular
subpopulation of taxpayers. 12
In prior works, I expressed the thought that highlighting racial inequities in
the Code is a useful task because exposure is the best avenue for promoting discourse
with respect to whether the inequalities can be justified. 13 That view remains
unchanged. It is beyond my comprehension that someone would be anything other
than vigilant about inequities in the Code. As Professor Margaret Montoya aptly
observes “budgets are moral documents; budgets, including tax expenditures, expose
and reveal our lawmakers’ values and commitments.” 14 Another colleague, Professor
should strive for a tax system that (1) minimizes interference with economic decision making, (2) is fair,
and (3) is easy to administer and comply with.”); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax
Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567–69 (1965); Leo P. Martinez, The Problem with Taxes: Fairness, Tax
Policy, and the Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 414 (2004).The idea of fairness as an integral
part of the Code does not necessarily resonate with the American people. See Brian J. Gaines, Flat is Fair:
American Public Opinion on Taxes and the Myth of Egalitarianism, INDEP. REV. 93, 103 (Summer 2017).
In 2011, the Pew Institute conducted a “fairly representative” poll in which “the most popular choice for
describing the current system was ‘moderately fair’ (40 percent), ahead of ‘not too fair’ (31 percent) and
‘not fair at all’ (24 percent).” Tax System Seen as Unfair, in Need of Overhaul, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, (December 20, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/12/20/tax-system-seen-asunfair-in-need-of-overhaul/.
11. “Wealth” could mean a personal residence, as well as liquid and illiquid assets, depending
on the context and the applicable Code provision. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2018) (mortgage interest
deduction); 26 U.S.C. § 2013 (2018) (definition of “gross estate” for estate tax purposes).
It is important, however, not to conflate income/wealth level with race/ethnicity. While there is some
overlap, the concepts are separate and distinct.
12. My colleague, Professor Heather Field observes that my generality ignores, for now, the
caveat that subpopulations of taxpayers are not completely homogenous. For example, the class of Latino
law professors might be substantially different in terms of education, income and wealth than the Latino
population in general. The same observation could certainly be made with any subpopulation of taxpayers.
That said, a Code provision that adversely affects Latinos is not less adverse because some Latinos are not
disadvantaged. That is, while all Latino/as might not be similarly situated, neither are they similarly situated
to otherwise similar white people. See Wilton Hyman, Race, Class, and the Internal Revenue Code: A Class
Based Analysis of a Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 119, 120 (2006)
(suggesting a race-based approach is not up to the task “because it may eliminate tax provisions that benefit
middle-income blacks in an effort to assist lower-income blacks.”); Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and
Targets Hit: Critical Tax Studies and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (1998) (expressing
the idea that not all members of a group will want the same treatment); Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation
of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
1, 10 (2006) (showing that many Latinos are undocumented). Professor Francine Lipman writes that “the
high effective tax rates imposed on the poorest undocumented working families relative to their less
unfortunate friends and neighbors is inconsistent with fundamental tax policy.” Id. at 8.
13. Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6; Leo P. Martinez, Latinos and the Internal Revenue
Code: A Tax Policy Primer for the New Administration, 20 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 101 (2017).
14. Margaret Montoya, Threats Demand Our Action, THE ALBUQUERQUE J., (Mar. 24 2017),
https://www.abqjournal.com/975110/threats-demand-our-action.html, archived at https://perma.cc/FQX996E9; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through the Looking Glass with Alice and Larry: The Nature of
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Alice Abreu expresses the same view: “[a] study of the ways in which the law
entrenches the distribution of money and enhances its multiplication should be within
the purview of all scholars who care about anti-subordination, because the law can
entrench and abet the absence of money and thus contribute to continued
subordination.” 15 As participants in a constitutional democracy, our voices should
matter. Indeed, they must matter.
B. The Foundation of This Discussion
The pioneering work of Professors Beverly Moran and William Whitford in
1996, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 16 was the first significant article
to raise the question of whether the Code was biased toward racial and ethnic
minorities. They concluded that certain key Code provisions created benefits that were
outside the reach of many African Americans because of socioeconomic, educational,
and cultural differences.
Professors Moran’s and Whitford’s work drew most of the salient criticisms
of critical tax theory in the 1998 symposium issue of the North Carolina Law
Review. 17 The few criticisms since then trace their genealogy to that symposium. A
few scholars followed Professor Moran’s and Whitford’s lead in questioning the
Code’s effects on other groups. These scholars demonstrated that different treatment
of some taxpayers based on their particular ethnicity or race was observable and
demonstrable. 18
Yet, since the symposium, neither the critical tax scholars nor their critics
have devoted much effort to a comprehensive response to the criticism. A fair
question, then, is why this has not been given more attention over the years. Why don’t
those who earnestly believe that the Code is unfair as applied to certain subpopulations
of taxpayers fight it? There are several plausible explanations.
First, there is an insidious aspect to the effects of the Code. As Professor
Abreu has observed, as “tax systems often act invisibly, they may be even more
dangerous than systems that act overtly and thus invite more immediate scrutiny and
resistance.” 19 While certainly true, this observation is nevertheless incomplete. Tax
policy—in contrast to taxes, which are measured by the total amount paid—does not
receive its due. Someone predisposed to discounting critical tax theory might believe
that the case has irrefutably been made, 20 and not have any inclination to further
investigate the issue. Thus, it is worth our effort to look deeper.
Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1609 (1998) (“Taxes also tell us more generally about our society, since what
we tax and how we tax reflect a multitude of philosophical, social, and political choices.”).
15. Abreu, supra note 3, at 576.
16. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,
1996 WIS. L. REV. 751 (1997).
17. Symposium, Critical Tax Theory: Criticism and Response, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1998).
18. Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN AM. L.J. 117, 124
(2004); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465,
466 (2000) (noting various ways in which the Internal Revenue Code disadvantages homosexuals).
Professor David Brennan surveyed related literature some years ago. See David Brennan, Race and Equality
Across the Law School Curriculum: The Law of Tax Exemption, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 337 n.5 (2004).
19. Abreu, supra note 3.
20. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax as Urban Legend, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 229 (2008)
(reviewing ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006) (“‘mainstream apathy’
towards critical tax theory seems to be on as firm a footing as ever.”)).
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Second, a short story about the glacial pace of racial justice regarding matters
much less esoteric than tax policy might shed some light on the lack of attention to
this area. On May 17, 2000—the forty-sixth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education—the American Civil Liberties Union, Public Advocates, the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and other civil rights organizations,
along with Morrison & Foerster LLP, filed a class-action lawsuit, styled Williams v.
California, on behalf of public school students against the State of California. 21 The
plaintiffs argued that the State and its agencies were denying thousands of students
their fundamental right to an education, as provided under the California
Constitution, 22 by failing to provide them with the basic tools necessary for that
education. The State operated thousands of classrooms without enough textbooks for
students; provided school facilities that were overcrowded, in disrepair, and unhealthy
for students; and employed many under-trained teachers. The most affected schools
were located primarily in urban areas and children who were members of racial or
ethnic minorities disproportionately attended them. 23
While it should strain credulity that such cases have to be brought in the
twenty-first century, it serves to highlight that members of racial and ethnic minorities
and their advocates are often distracted by matters more elemental than the effects of
tax policy on their lives. Indeed, according to celebrated psychologist Abraham
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, self-actualization cannot be reached if one is dealing
with matters that impact basic survival. 24 In the same manner, the parents and children
affected by the Williams litigation were concerned about receiving a basic education;
taxes were not on their minds. When racial and ethnic minorities are concerned with
accessing necessities of life, the tax system becomes an abstract concept, an
afterthought unrelated to very present exigencies faced. 25 Thus, their advocates are
steered in a particular direction.
Finally, a reason for the lack of research in this area is the dearth of relevant
data. 26 The Internal Revenue Service does not collect demographic data from
taxpayers. 27 One reason Professors Moran and Whitford began their examination with
African Americans was because data was perceived to be more widely available for

21. Brooks M. Allen, Williams v. California: A Progress Update, ACLU FOUND. S. CAL.
(2009), http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/Williams_Progress_Update_May_2009.pdf. This story is
repeated in another work urging all to avoid complacency in achieving a perfect union. Leo P. Martinez,
Toward A More Perfect Union?: The Dangers of Conflating Progress and Equality, 44 SW. L. REV. 727,
732–33 (2015).
22. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
23. Cindy Lavorato & Frank Spencer, Back to the Future with Race-Based Mandates: A
Response to Missed Opportunity, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1747, 1774–75 (2010).
24. Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCH. REV. 370 (1943)
(outlining a hierarchy of needs).
25. Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, “Globalization,”
and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731, 741 (2000). As one scholar astutely observes, “[t]ax
scholars themselves have become less interested in overall tax structure and more interested in provisions
affecting women, minorities, and other discrete, identifiable groups.” Id.
26. Knauer, supra note 10, at 221 n.36 (noting dearth of relevant information); J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base: A
Critique of the “New Paradigm” and its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010) (generally discussing
dearth of information and data).
27. Richard Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Impact Case
Been Made?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1823 (1998).
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this group. 28 The lack of data complicates and discourages further work.
It is entirely possible that critical tax theory has reached a stage of maturity
such that its precepts are a given, much as might be the case with corporate or
international tax. Evidence in support of this proposition is scant. The suggestion that
the debate has not advanced in any significant way since the North Carolina
symposium is a powerful one.
Few pursue this area of inquiry. This, coupled with the enormity of the task,
the misguided belief of most tax scholars that the Code is neutral, and a dearth of data,
all suggest that there is much work to be done. 29 The importance of pointing out
unfairness causes me to cling to this work.

II.

CRITIQUES OF CRITICAL TAX THEORY AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS

I begin with an outline of some of the major critiques of critical tax theory
and discuss how each is flawed. My goal is not necessarily to be comprehensive; rather
it is to gather sufficient material to shift the burden of proof to the other side. For too
long has it appeared that critical tax scholars have borne the burden of proof. This must
change.
A. All Taxpayers are Treated Fairly and Alike
A fundamental theory underlying the Code is that it contains a neutral set of
statutes that apply equally to all taxpayers. 30 Under this theory, the only important
distinction to the Code is income level, rather than demographic differences like race,
gender, and ethnicity. 31
While this position is simplistic, it is easily rebutted by Anatole France’s
description of law as having that “majestic quality . . . which prohibits the wealthy as
well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from
stealing bread.” 32 In France’s world, the rich and the poor were subject to the same
limitation on their behavior—neither could steal a crust of bread. The law could be
seen as fair in this regard. France’s genius was to recognize that this “equal” treatment
bore upon the poor more harshly than the rich. 33
28. Moran & Whitford, supra note 16, at 754.
29. Brown, Fellows, Bridget, note 2.
30. Knauer, supra note 10, at 219–20 (observing but not endorsing the theory of neutrality);
Schmalbeck, supra note 27, at 1834 (“The federal income tax is certainly facially race-neutral.”); Johnson,
supra note 12, at 1781 (underscoring that the Code provides something for everyone implicitly arguing for
the offset mode); Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law
and the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1237 (2007) (some dispute that law plays some role in
the creation and maintenance of wealth disparities based upon race); Brown, Fellows, Bridget, note 2, at 65
(“most nontax scholars erroneously believe tax law’s technical rules chiefly are designed to achieve
nonbiased and objective purposes.”).
31. Knauer, supra note 10, at 210; see also Schmalbeck, supra note 27 (highlighting that the
IRS does not collect demographic data from taxpayers; thus, complicating research in this area).
32. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE 49 (1894). Anatole France won the 1921 Nobel Prize
for literature. For an excellent explication of historical relief mechanisms for the poor, see Larry C. Backer,
Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a General Theory of Modern
American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871, 953–65 (1995).
33. A recent article cleverly captures this sentiment. Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack,
Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 493 (“A [seemingly neutral tax]
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In much the same way, many scholars have shown that individual Code
provisions treat racial and ethnic minorities in different ways—even when controlling
for income level. 34 Without rehashing the literature, the case that some Code
law as implemented may incorporate or exacerbate existing gender bias.”).
34. The following is not an exhaustive listing. I use it to illustrate that there is much written
about this problem. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 16 (addressing four concrete areas including (1)
benefits granted to wealth and wealth transfers, (2) the benefits of homeownership, (3) employee benefits
associated with pension plans, and (4) the different tax rate treatment of single and married persons). In
another work, my daughter and I have examined five different areas. They were: the deduction for personal
residence interest, the Code benefits associated with pension plans, the treatment of undocumented persons,
the tax benefits provided under the Code for the pursuit of higher education, and the Earned Income Tax
Credit. Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6, at 391–401. We examined the first two in order to compare and
contrast with two of the areas touched on by Moran and Whitford. We examined the last two to test whether
the suggestion that the Earned Income Tax Credit serves to even out inequities in the Code is supported. In
each area, we show that Latino realities result in significant differences in the way the Code deals with the
equally wealthy (or equally poor) in different racial groups.
Professor Dorothy A. Brown has been relentless in her coverage of this area. Dorothy A. Brown,
Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 343–44 (2009) (showing how federal tax
subsidies for homeownership create winners and losers generally along racial and class lines); Dorothy A.
Brown, Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L. J. 755, 823 (2005) (showing how
middle-class white children receive Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit benefits while lowincome children who are disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities do not); Dorothy A. Brown,
Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1514 (2004) (discussing how Latinos, blacks,
and Asians are less likely to participate in their employer-provided tax-favored pension plans); Dorothy A.
Brown, The 535 Report: A Pathway to Fundamental Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1155 (2013) (noting that
slightly more than two in ten Latino workers participate in their tax-favored pension plans or are eligible for
this benefit). Professor Brown observes that less than one-third of Latino workers have jobs that come with
tax-favored pension benefits; even when Latinos have jobs that do provide pension benefits, an even smaller
group actually participates. Id. Others have reached similar conclusions. See Amy L. Cavanaugh, Cultural
Relevance: An Essential Component of Participant Education, 42 BENEFITS L.J. 25 (2012) (broadly
discussing the lack of Latino participation in tax-advantaged pension plans.).
To the extent racial and ethnic minorities have historically amassed little capital, they are illequipped to take advantage of Code provisions that require accumulated wealth such as the home mortgage
deductions and capital investment benefits. John Edwards, A Tax System that Embraces Fairness and
Equality, 73 SOC. RES. 431, 439 (2006) (noting that one-quarter of all Latino households had zero or
negative wealth); Lipman, supra note 12, at 5 (noting the comparatively low rate of home ownership by
Latinos means that the very real tax benefits associated with home ownership are not well distributed); Alice
Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle- and Lowincome Generosity, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 339 (1997) (observing low-income taxpayers,
disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities, are not well placed to take advantage of the deduction for
home mortgage interest).
Others have joined the fray. Akari Atoyama-Little, Taxing Single Mothers: A Critical Look at
the Tax Code, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2146, 2169 (2013) (making the case that Latina single mothers are
systematically disadvantaged by the Code); Martin Chavez, Remittances and the Charitable Deduction: A
New Approach to Encouraging Development in Mexico, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 593–94
(2011) (recognizing the disparate effect of seemingly neutral tax legislation and arguing for use of the
charitable tax deduction to encourage increased spending of collective remittances by Latino immigrants in
order to further benefit specific communities within and without the United States); Uy, supra note 18
(discussing treatment of Asians under the Code); Infanti, supra note 9 (broadly outlining how gays are
treated differently under the Code); Cain, supra note 18 (noting various ways in which the Internal Revenue
Code disadvantages gays and gay couples); Schmalbeck, supra note 27 (“tentatively persuaded that
there really may be important features of the federal income tax that raise horizontal equity concerns.”);
Crawford & Spivack, supra note 33 (analyzing the uneven application of “neutral” state tax law on women);
Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (advocating taxation of imputed income for
work performed in the home as a means of recognizing the value of women’s labor); Anne L. Alstott, Tax
Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2006–08
(1996) (outlining proposals for feminist tax reform). Professor David Brennan neatly surveyed related
literature extant in the year 2004 and before. Brennan, supra note 18.
Finally, Professor Francine Lipman has explored the ill-treatment, under the Code, of the
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provisions are skewed against racial and ethnic minorities is a strong one.
In developing a taxonomy of the criticism, I realized that the critics of critical
tax theory do not directly disagree or explicitly refute the idea that subpopulations of
taxpayers are treated differently. 35 Certainly, no one seems to deny that subpopulations
are disparately affected. 36 Instead, the critics take issue with one or more aspects that
are peripheral to this basic proposition. For instance, some criticisms do not focus on
the underlying inequities of the Code, but rather on the rigor of the scholarship. Some
critics believe critical tax scholars are over eager to accuse the Code of hostility, that
critical tax scholars selectively choose Code provisions that are disadvantageous to
subpopulations, and that critical tax scholars fail to think through proposed solutions. 37
These and other criticisms are outlined below.
B. The Progressive Rate Structure Cures All
A small refinement of the basic argument about tax neutrality posits that lowincome taxpayers—a proxy for ethnic and racial minorities—are beneficiaries of the
low tax rates characteristic of a progressive tax structure. 38
There are a number of problems with this view. First, it ignores the fact that
even when controlling for income level, subpopulations of taxpayers experience
different levels of taxation that correlate with race and ethnicity. 39
Second, it ignores the fact that those who occupy the bottom rungs of the
income ladder are unable to exploit the many Code provisions available only to those
who have accumulated wealth. 40 These Code provisions range from capital gains to
accelerated cost recovery to mortgage interest deductions. Indeed, some have
suggested that the Code is complicit in an ever-increasing income gap between rich
and poor. 41
Third, the proper or “fair” rate of progressive taxation is difficult to fix. A
100 percent rate followed by a distribution could be the extreme. We have come close
with ninety percent maximum marginal tax rates and the republic was able to
survive. 42 As recently as 1986, the United States had seventy percent maximum

undocumented who are primarily Latinos. Lipman, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that undocumented
immigrants pay billions each year in excise, property, and payroll taxes, and that hundreds of thousands
more file state and federal tax returns); Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law
into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M.L. Rev. 219 (1991) (concluding undocumented immigrants pay more
in taxes than they cost in social services); Luis Larrea, Taxation Inequality and Undocumented Immigrants,
5 Lᴀᴡ Rᴀᴢᴀ 1 (2013) (undocumented immigrants, who are overwhelmingly Latino, pay a disproportionate
amount of taxes compare to the benefits they receive.).
35. See Nancy C. Staudt, Tax Theory and “Mere Critique:” A Reply to Professor Zelenak, 76
N.C.L. REV. 1581, 1584 (1998) (noting that Professor Zelenak does not deny that a problem exists).
36. Id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1566–67.
37. Zelenak, supra note 7; see also, Eric Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA.
TAX REV. 39, 108 (1996) (even the underlying goal of “fairness” is not susceptible to simple formulations
because fairness can mean different things to different people.).
38. Bryce, supra note 5; see also Schmalbeck, supra note 27, at 1819 (describing an initial
response to this phenomenon).
39. Moran & Whitford, supra note 16; Uy, supra note 18; Cain, supra note 18.
40. Livingston, supra note 25 (progressivity is less effective at assisting the very poor because
many poor people do not pay income taxes at all.).
41. David Wessel, How much does the tax code reduce inequality?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (2015)
(answer—not much).
42. Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case
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marginal tax rates. Currently, the tax rate in the United States is 39.6 percent. 43 Is one
rate of taxation any better or worse than the other? Maybe the conclusion is that
progressive taxation is too blunt an instrument in order to achieve greater tax equity
across racial and ethnic lines.
Finally, tax rates may not be progressive at all. At least one researcher has
found that the bottom twenty percent of income earners pay an effective tax rate of
twenty-seven percent while the top twenty percent of income earners pay at an
effective tax rate of nine percent. 44
C. Selection Bias in the Choice of Code Sections Examined
Critics openly question critical tax theory’s focus on Code provisions that,
they argue, advance a particular point of view. 45 Essentially, critical tax scholars are
accused of deliberately cherry-picking Code sections that feed into a favorable
narrative. A subtext of this argument is that critiques of the Code themselves
uncritically assume that the income tax is a neutral baseline and that the Code
provisions that disadvantage one racial group might be offset by provisions that
advantage that same group. 46
The first response is a methodological retort. Professor William Whitford, the
coauthor of A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 47 refutes the idea that he
should have resorted to a random selection of Code provisions for his study. 48 He
argued that the study was an initially exploratory one in which “one would never
randomly select the Code provisions to be studied. There is too great a risk that a
random method would select an inconsequential section, or one about which it is
impossible to obtain relevant data, and the goal of testing our method would not be
achieved.” 49 He deliberately chose Code provisions for which data was available. 50
Not only is this approach methodologically defensible, but it also reflects common
sense.
My response is more nuanced. First, a determination of unfairness does not
necessarily require a neutral baseline. 51 For example, no one would disagree with the
for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 12 (1998) (“[I]n 1965 the top rate was reduced to 70 percent
as part of a general tax cut, and 1969 the top rate on ‘earned income’ was reduced to 50 percent.”).
43. I.R.C. § 1 (imposing the income tax). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed into law by
President Donald Trump in December 2017 will reduce the top rate to thirty-seven percent,
https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20171218/CRPT-115HRPT-466.pdf.
44. Bret N. Bogenschneider, Critical Legal Studies and Regressive Taxation in the United
States, 10 HARV. UNBOUND J. OF LEGAL L. 98 (2015).
45. Zelenak, supra note 7.
46. Id.
47. Moran & Whitford, supra note 16.
48. William C. Whitford, Remarkable, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (1998).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6, at 387. In commenting on the prior work, Professor
Leandra Lederman raised the question of why it isn’t the overall result that matters. Her comments are worth
repeating:
For example, if Code sec. X provides that women have $500 of extra gross income,
but Code sec. Y allows only women a $500 above-the-line deduction, presumably
Code sec. X is not unfair, because its result is undone by sec. Y. It would be
misleading to look just at sec. X in the abstract. My example is of course artificial. I
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notion that it would be unfair to tax women based on a rate schedule that is ten percent
higher than the rate schedule for men, regardless of whether the income tax base is
neutral. In the same way, a similar reaction might follow a more nuanced examination
of certain Code provisions that are overall neutral but benefit or burden specific groups
over others.
Second, it is possible, though highly unlikely, that Code provisions
disfavoring one group over another may mask a grand design so that these Code
provisions are balanced out by provisions that favor the same, previously
disadvantaged, ethnic group. The rationale would be that the different treatments even
out in the wash as a sort of rudimentary justice. Assuming a random distribution of
favorable and unfavorable Code provisions, this idea may be even demonstrable. The
criticism, then, is that some scholars (including me) have spent their efforts on the
Code provisions that are unfavorable to racial and ethnic minorities while ignoring
more favorable. 52
My intuition, however, is that the distribution of favorable and unfavorable
Code provisions is not random or, perhaps more accurately, does not counterbalance
Code inequities. However attractive the idea might seem—certainly no articulation of
this idea has found a voice in the enactment of any Code provision—I have left to
others the task of showing that this intuition is not well-founded. So far, the challenge
has gone unanswered.
Despite the foregoing, it might be possible to show at a macro-level the
maldistribution of the tax benefits provided by the Code. A tax expenditure analysis
of the Code might reveal the degree of maldistribution. I address this below in the
discussion of the Earned Income Tax Credit.
D. The Earned Income Credit Cures All
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides for a tax refund (even
if no tax is paid or owed) to low-income taxpayers, is often cited by critical tax theory
opponents as carrying the weight of balancing the Code provisions unfavorable to
racial and ethnic minorities. 53 At the outset, it is worth questioning whether the EITC
think a good rebuttal is that absent a situation where one Code section neatly undoes
the effect of another, looking at the effects of the Code overall still might have a
disproportionate impact. For example, if some Code sections favor married couples
and others favor unmarried couples, is the Code neutral as to marriage? Not
necessarily. It depends on the amounts of benefits and burdens, as well as whether
subsets of each group are disproportionately benefitted [sic] or are burdened. For
example, it could be that all the marriage penalty provisions apply to elderly couples,
so the Code encourages marriage only late in life. The former would not be neutral
as to marriage for any couple, even if, overall, the Code penalized some couples by
the same amount it benefited other couples.
52. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 16.
53. Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1568 (“It seems likely the benefits [of the EITC] go
disproportionately to blacks.”); Bryce, supra note 5, at 1695–96 (“Economists have estimated that . . . 24
percent of earned income tax credit recipients are black . . . because they are less likely to be married and
less likely to be affected by the phase-out.”); Schmalbeck, supra note 27 (mentioning that the EITC favors
black taxpayers); Johnson, supra note 12, at 1781(“[T]he less affluent (and disproportionately black) have
less in home ownership tax benefits, [but] they do have . . . a substantial refundable earned income credit.”).
The undocumented fare poorly under the EITC. They do not qualify for the EITC and one
undocumented family member taints the entire household. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(E) (requiring a taxpayer
identification number in order to be eligible); see Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic

60

BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:49

offsets discriminatory Code provisions before beginning with a back-of-the-envelope
analysis of the tax expenditure budget. If the EITC functions to offset discriminatory
Code provisions, then the Code, indeed, contains discriminatory provisions. Whether
the EITC functions in this way or it is a legitimate undertaking is another matter.
One way to analyze the relative fairness of the EITC is to examine tax
expenditures. Tax expenditures are those benefits provided by the Code which reduce
a taxpayer’s tax liability “[b]y offering tax breaks to taxpayers who engage in favored
activities, [which] Congress ‘spends’ by for[e?]going collection of taxes that otherwise
would be due.” 54 As many scholars have observed, tax expenditures are effectively
direct spending programs that encourage certain behaviors, such as charitable
donations. 55 Therefore, it is instructive to see how the tax expenditures are allocated
among taxpayers.
According to the Tax Policy Center, a nonpartisan tax policy think tank, the
thirteen largest tax expenditures will total approximately $1.2 trillion in Fiscal Year
2018. 56 The EITC is eighth on the list at $63.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2018. The table
below shows the entire picture:

Injustices of Undocumented Immigrant Families: A New Class of “Undeserving” Working Poor, 7 NEV.
L.J. 736, 743–46 (2007) (discussing the EITC and the undocumented).
54. Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 981 (2011).
55. Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 643,
644 (2012); Mason, supra note 54, at 981–87.
56. URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST. TAX POL’Y CTR., BRIEFING BOOK 90 (2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/tpc-briefing-book_1.pdf (In Fiscal Year
2018 these expenditures include: $235.8 billion for the exclusion of employers’ contributions for
employees’ medical insurance premiums and medical care; $112.7 billion for the exclusion of net imputed
rental income; $68.1 billion for the home-mortgage interest deduction; $63.3 billion for non-business
property taxes as part of the deductibility of non-business state and local taxes; $48.5 billion to the
exemption of the first $500,000 of capital gains for couples ($250,000 for singles) on the sale of principal
residences.).
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Rank

Tax Expenditure

Billions ($)

1

Exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance
premiums and medical care
Exclusion of net imputed rental income
Deferral of income from controlled foreign corporations (normal
tax method)
Capital gains (except agriculture, timber, iron ore, and coal)
Defined benefit employer plans
Defined contribution employer plans
Mortgage interest expense on owner-occupied residences
Earned income tax credit
Deductibility of non-business state and local taxes other than on
owner-occupied homes
Child credit
Step-up basis of capital gains at death
Deductibility of charitable contributions, other than education and
health
Accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment (normal tax
method)

235.8

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

112.7
112.6
108.6
71.0
69.4
68.1
63.6
63.3
54.3
54.1
51.2
50.3

Here, several observations can be made. First, although many have examined
the discriminatory effects of specific Code provisions, to suggest that these effects are
offset by the EITC, which accounts for only 5.3 percent of the total tax expenditure
budget (the $63.6 billion EITC is 5.3 percent of the $1.2 trillion tax expenditure budget
of the top thirteen items), is misplaced. Indeed, my own prior examination of Code
provisions focused on two items in the Fiscal Year 2018 tax expenditure budget:
pension plans that comprise $140.4 billion ($69.4 billion in defined contribution plans
plus $71 billion in defined benefit plans) and the mortgage interest deduction totaling
$68.9 billion. My other two areas did not make the top thirteen tax expenditures. 57 The
$213.3 billion total (pension plans plus mortgage interest) that appears to discriminate
against racial and ethnic minorities is offset, in the critic’s view by the $63.6 billion
which is represented by the EITC. On an order-of-magnitude basis, this does not seem
a fair criticism. But as I show below, diving deeper into the data shows that the picture
is far worse.
Second, Professor Dorothy Brown has observed that “less than half of EITCeligible taxpayers are racial or ethnic minorities.” 58 The result is that the so-called
balancing of Code provisions is attenuated further. It is thus at best questionable
whether the EITC could even begin to accomplish distributional equity by balancing
57. Id. I did not examine the remaining items in the top thirteen. None, save the child care
credit, seems likely to make up for the differences caused by pension plans or the mortgage interest
deduction. Other items on the list, such as capital gains ($108.6 billion) or deferral of income from foreign
controlled corporations ($112.6 billion), seem likely candidates to exacerbate the problem.
58. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM L. REV. 790, 821.
Professor Brown further notes that “less than 20% of EITC eligible taxpayers are Latino.” Id. Even the most
ardent critics of critical tax theory concede that blacks, among others, receive less than a majority of the
benefits under the EITC. See Bryce, supra note 5, at 1695 (estimating blacks’ share at twenty-four percent).
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off the discriminatory effects of other Code provisions. 59 The EITC as it currently
stands is a poor proxy for a solution that does not even begin to solve the tax disparity
problem which disproportionately affects minorities.
Third, and as if to rub salt on an open wound, one researcher notes that EITC
recipients are subjected to approximately 461,000 IRS audits per year. 60 This suggests
that resorting to the EITC is somewhat less than systematically encouraged and
undermines the argument that Code provisions can in effect balance out in the long
run. At best, the EITC is an inadequate offset of the discriminatory effects of other
Code provisions, and at worst, the EITC is a cruel hoax.
Accordingly, the theory that the EITC helps racial minorities receive the tax
benefits they need should be questioned. We are entitled to a Code that is, if not
perfectly neutral, at least as neutral as possible. If this is a defensible view, each Code
provision should be able to stand on its own—subject to a test of whether it is equitable
or not. The notion that one Code provision should exist to offset the discriminatory
effects of another Code provision should offend us all. In short, the EITC although
equitable in theory, fails in practice. Furthermore, implicit within this argument is tacit
admission that, at least with respect to certain Code provisions, discriminatory effects
actually exist. Pronouncements that suggest that the EITC or any other Code provision
offset the harmful effects of other Code provisions are simply not defensible. The
purported offset is not demonstrable as a matter of substance and process.
E. The Case for Disparate Impact Is Weak
Professor Richard Schmalbeck, a respected tax scholar, seemed to question
whether the disparate impact of the Code was real or not. 61 The title of his work, Race
and the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Impact Case Been Made?, might lead
the casual reader to conclude that the case for disparate impact is weak. Nonetheless,
on closer examination, it becomes clear that Schmalbeck’s question is merely
rhetorical. Indeed, Schmalbeck acknowledges that taxpayers, including those in
subpopulations consisting of racial and ethnic minorities “are entitled to the benefits
of horizontally equitable tax laws.” 62 Schmalbeck understands that subpopulations of
taxpayers can differ in important respects and, as a consequence, might be treated
differently. 63 He concludes that the case regarding disparate impact and the Code has
been made, even if it could have been made better. His work serves to highlight the
tacit recognition that there is a problem that is largely unaddressed.
F. The Code is Too Complex to Address the Problem
Professor Charles O. Galvin has noted “[l]ower-income, middle-income, or
higher-income African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, or other
groups all struggle with the human predicament. To try to solve particular problems
through the Internal Revenue Code would present a daunting challenge no lawmaker
59. Brown, Fellows, Bridget, note 2, at 64 (observing the lack of support for the claims that the
EITC benefits blacks disproportionately). This view further homogenizes minority groups in unhelpful and
disparaging ways by assuming that everyone in minority groups is poor enough to be EITC eligible.
60. Bogenschneider, supra note 44, at 99.
61. Schmalbeck, supra note 27, at 1817.
62. Id. at 1821.
63. Id. at 1817.
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should or could take on.” 64 Galvin is not alone in suggesting that the already complex
Code presents a formidable challenge to address racial and ethnic bias. 65
However, my reaction is different. Although tax policy is difficult, I concede
that even the apparently simple taxation of a married couple raises difficult issues.
That said, why should we not want to improve the Code to the point that blatant
inequities are addressed? The problems pointed out by various scholars are not
difficult to track. 66 Yet there is a lack of initiative to deal with the problems in even
the most rudimentary way. This must change. These results should be as appalling to
policymakers as they are to those who are shortchanged.
A core tenet of tax policy is that taxes have to be perceived as fair. To the
extent taxes are not fair we invite chaos and noncompliance. Lawmakers must have
the initiative and the will to address problems. Professor Anthony C. Infanti has
written that “[a]nyone who devotes herself to the task of furthering the equity of our
tax system must, by definition, be engaged in the noble task of making that system
fairer—of ensuring that all taxpayers are treated in an impartial and even-handed
manner.” 67 In short, we should approach our system of taxation in a way that reflects
our better selves working to create an equitable community.
G. No Solutions Are Proposed
The final criticism is the easiest to deal with because it has been addressed.
The criticism is that because the critical tax scholars do not always propose solutions,
the scholarship is not worthy of attention or at least merits diminished attention. 68
Notwithstanding, this criticism misapprehends the very nature of scholarly inquiry.
As Professor Marjorie E. Kornhauser has noted, while:
[O]ne role of scholarship is to propose solutions to problems, . . . it
is not the only one. There are many other valid purposes of
scholarship, such as describing what exists, exploring historical
origins, and identifying problems. Consequently, a blanket criticism
64. Galvin, supra note 5, at 1753 (advocating for a consumption-type tax). Professor Anthony
Infanti’s retort to Professor Galvin dripped with sarcasm. He wrote:
To paraphrase Galvin’s article: Taking the reality of invidious discrimination into
account makes tax policy analysis far too complicated and messy. Tax policy analysis
is much simpler and tidier when the possibility of discrimination is flatly ignored,
when we assume that the real and ideal are one and the same, and when we focus
only on the economic aspects of taxation with which we are far more comfortable.
Infanti, supra note 4, at 1220.
65. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1783–84.
66. This probably overstates the ease with which ferreting out discriminatory Code provisions
can be done. Schmalbeck, supra note 27, at 1823 (the apparent racial blindness of the Code may make it
difficult to discover horizontal discrimination in tax returns). Perhaps this explains the “selection bias” noted
by the critics. What is viewed as “selection bias” may very well reflect a focus on those Code provisions
that reveal, in connection with other available data, basic discrimination.
67. Infanti, supra note 4, at 1199.
68. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1573 (in response to Moran and Whitford, Professor
Zelenak criticized proposed solutions because “[t]hey are described only in broad outline, and their
implications are not carefully explored.”); Johnson, supra note 12, at 1771–72 (arguing that to be fully
persuasive a critical view of the Code should show a solution exists).
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that the scholarship fails to offer solutions indicates a far too narrow
view of scholarship. 69
An immediate solution is not required to advance an idea. For example,
science is rife with circumstances in which researchers posed a problem whose
solution was not forthcoming for decades. 70 Even so, a problem discovered or
illuminated does not magically disappear if there is no answer. Often the discovery of
the problem is the catalyst for an entire body of research and subsequent knowledge.
Here, any contribution to the tax analysis scholarship exposes the vaunted neutrality
of the Code for what it is. 71
Similarly, a solution that is incomplete or inadequate in the eyes of the critic
does not justify ignoring the problem. 72 Solutions to knotty issues do not always arise
immediately and solutions, like many Code provisions, are effectively works in
progress. 73 To suggest that scholarship merits attention only when the scholarship
produces fully functioning solutions sets the bar too high and also misperceives the
fundamental nature of scholarly inquiry. 74 The natural response to this criticism is that
any information is useful information, and even absent a workable solution, the study
is worthwhile and can promote the finding of other solutions. In analyzing this, one is
tempted to agree with the suggestions made by some that the perceived threat of
critical tax scholars seems to stifle objectivity and intellectual honesty. 75

III.

POSSIBLE APPROACHES

With the preceding in mind, it is a daunting task to discuss potential solutions.
While I might be accused of leaving stones unturned and tempt a critic to discount this
article, I am more hopeful that outlining possible approaches will lead to more
examination of the topic. For example, Professor Zelenak has suggested that some
69. Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 1622.
70. For example, the mathematics that predicted the possibility of coherent light predated the
laser by many years. Emil Wolf, Early Days of Coherence Theory and the First Rochester Conference on
Coherence at 159, in A JEWEL IN THE CROWN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
INSTITUTE OF OPTICS (Carlos Stroud ed. 2004); see JOAN LISA BROMBERG, THE LASER IN AMERICA, 1950–
1970 (1991); NICK TAYLOR, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL LAUREATE, AND THE THIRTY-YEAR
PATENT WAR (2000).
71. Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 1626.
72. Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1772 (arguing that a “reasonable” solution should exist).
73. Kornhauser, supra note 14 (solutions might be in their “infancy.”). Even one who advocates
for solutions concedes that identifying a problem is a worthy task. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1771
(“Something similar may be said of critical tax studies. Such studies have shown that the Internal Revenue
Code as a whole, or significant features of it, disadvantage—intentionally or unintentionally—groups
historically oppressed or ignored by American society. Some of these arguments have had force, but many,
have failed to present a persuasive case. However, that does not mean that even those efforts have been
wasted. Like alchemy, those efforts have been worthwhile because they have hit unintended but still
important targets.”).
74. Staudt, supra note 35 (noting the irony that the critics of critical tax theory also fail to
advance a solution).
75. Brown, supra note 34, at 365 (2009) (an incisive and biting commentary about those whose
otherwise sound judgment appears clouded when issues of race arise); Brown, Fellows, Bridget, note 2, at
64 (“This type of unsubstantiated claim that a genre of scholarship lacks rigor, while offering no independent
authority other than self-proclaimed assertions about probability or suspicion, suggests that the matters
uncovered by critical tax analysis evoke a visceral reaction that in some cases blocks intellectual
engagement.”).
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solutions to discriminatory Code provisions go too far, in his judgment, amounting to
more a “surrender than a solution.” 76 That said, he is willing to consider retention of
the Code provision but combining it with “education and exhortation” to encourage
the use of the Code by those otherwise adversely affected. 77 His approach is one I have
embraced in the past, 78 and one that I will continue to embrace.
Going forward, the challenge is how to integrate the critiques in thinking
about the future of tax law, with a variety of possible approaches. What follows is the
beginning of a necessary foundation for future analysis.
A. Is the Code Progressive Enough?
The answer to the question of whether the Code is progressive enough, which
is to ask whether it is fair enough, raises the question of what precisely we consider
fair. Not only is it difficult to determine what is fair, but it is also plain that what is
“fair” means different things to different people. 79 A sense of the dilemma is given by
the diversity of opinion on the subject. On one hand, some suggest that the Code is too
progressive. 80 Others see that a progressive tax system “may be necessary in order to
preserve [a dynamic, merit-based society].” 81 Even apart from perceptions of fairness,
the rates we fix to achieve a fair system are far from certain. As I suggested above, the
very fact that maximum tax rates have ranged from ninety percent to 39.6 percent in
the course of my professional career, reflects the indeterminacy of fairness.
While my views align with the idea that progressive taxation is a good thing,
I am beginning to harbor doubts. Certainly, progressive taxation seems to have done
little to stem the increase in income inequality. 82 Or, perhaps it has been instrumental
in slowing the growth of income inequality. 83 While many members of the tax
community would disagree with me, progressive taxation has its limitations in
achieving fundamental tax fairness.
B. Shortcomings of a Progressive Tax System
There are many reasons that a progressive tax system fails. First, a

76. Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1571.
77. Id. at 1572.
78. Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6.
79. Zolt, supra note 37; see also Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6.
80. Howard Gleckman, Is It Time To Rethink the Scale and Progressivity of the Tax System?,
TAX POL’Y CTR. (2016) (asking “[i]s the US [sic] tax code both too small and too progressive?” and citing
the work of Alan Viard and Sita Nataraj Slavov of the American Enterprise Institute).
81. Livingston, supra note 25, at 50. (“On a rhetorical level, scholars must make a more candid
and forceful case for progressivity as a means of redistribution, emphasizing the unfairness of today’s
“winner-take-all” society and the role of irrelevant factors such as race, gender, and immigrant status in
pretax income distributions.”).
82. Drew Desilver, U.S. income inequality, on rise for decades, is now highest since 1928, PEW
RES. CTR. (Dec. 5, 2013); Bruce Drake, Americans see widening income gap, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec.
5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/americans-see-growing-gap-between-richand-poor/.
83. One prominent scholar notes “Although taxes cannot level up distributional inequities,
proper fiscal design can avoid increasing inequality. The main direct distributive role of taxes, however, is
to level down.” Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality: Redistribution
via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. Rev.
1627, 1682 (2005).
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progressive tax system does not address the circumstances of the very poor. Professor
Michael Livingston precisely captures the problem:
Progressivity is a good vehicle for redistributing income between
the upper and middle segments of society, but is generally less
effective at assisting the very poor. Many poor people do not pay
income taxes at all, and for those that do, sales and payroll levies
often remain more important than the income tax. Progressive (i.e.,
higher) taxes on the wealthy might in theory be used to fund direct
spending programs that benefit poor individuals, but this depends on
numerous political assumptions, and in the current political
environment it is unlikely that this would happen. 84
Second, progressivity is an incredibly crude and ineffective tool for
ameliorating the racial effects of the tax system. A progressive tax system is
insufficiently nuanced to address the different circumstances faced by ethnic and racial
minorities. I and others have argued that a horizontal equity approach in this instance
does not work well. That is because, even adjusting for incomes, racial and ethnic
minorities are not similarly situated. 85 They vary in terms of basic wealth and
educational accomplishment—factors that significantly affect the ability to exploit
seemingly neutral Code provisions. Progressive taxation (or horizontal equity), it
seems, may not be up to the task of addressing the situations of racial and ethnic
minorities.
C. Target Individual Code Provisions
Another approach would be the “testing” of individual Code provisions for
discriminatory effect. A threshold question is whether it is reasonable to focus
exclusively on one piece of the puzzle to the exclusion of all of its context without
being myopic. I maintain that this avenue is worth pursuing for several reasons. First,
it is a manageable task one can undertake systematically. Taking on the Code as a
cohesive whole would be a Herculean feat. Second, a holistic approach seems to place
a nearly impossible burden of proof of showing the Code contains discriminatory
provisions on those of us who claim the Code is not neutral—in addition to being
inherently suspect. Third, no one has yet shown that the offset theory is indeed true.
Finally, the symbolism of beginning in a systematic way, as outlined below, would be
powerful if it yielded results as I suspect.
I recognize that this might not be an easy task. One way to begin could be to
84. Livingston, supra note 25, at 741.
85. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919,
957 (1997) (“Horizontal fairness, however, can play only a small, almost insignificant, role in tax policy,
while the concept of vertical equity is key for tax policymaking and has been at the center of controversy
for over a century.”); Martinez & Martinez, supra note 6, at 426 (discussing the limits of being “similarly
situated”); Livingston, supra note 25, at 758 (“[C]ritical tax scholarship is more about vertical than
horizontal equity, so that attacks by traditional scholars miss the point to a considerable degree. The
argument is not that women or minorities are treated differently from similarly situated white men, but that
they are not similarly situated in the first place because of the historic real-world disadvantages that adhere
to these groups.”). Id. at 758 (opining that the starting point for critical scholarship is the dissimilarity of
status between racial and gender groups (citing Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative
Field: Putting “Critical Tax Scholarship” in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1797 (1988))).
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prioritize the effort in terms of tax expenditure amount. The task would start with the
largest tax expenditures, specifically with the exclusion of employer contributions for
medical insurance premiums and medical care. To the extent discriminatory tax
provisions are represented in the top tax expenditures, this approach would have two
major advantages. First, on a simple dollar basis, it would yield the greatest immediate
benefit. Second, it would have the virtue of avoiding the criticism that Code selection
was occurring in a way that only examines problematic provisions—by selecting Code
provisions based on the tax expenditure, the perceived selection bias is eliminated.
Within the tax legislative process, it should not be a difficult matter to
undertake this kind of review. There are tax experts on staff in both the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. 86 Similarly the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has a professional staff of attorneys, accountants,
and economists whose jobs are to assist members of Congress on tax legislation. 87
Another option could be to resort to the type of regulatory oversight performed by the
Office of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) that does cost-benefit analysis of all
regulations. 88
Yet another path is to emulate our Northern neighbors—the Canadian
government undertakes a comprehensive tax expenditure analysis of its tax code. 89
Among the discernible objectives of their analysis, several are centered around the
fairness of the Canadian tax system. 90 These include: promoting fairness of the tax
system, ensuring neutral tax treatment across similarly situated taxpayers, and
providing relief for special circumstances. 91 This kind of undertaking seeks to enhance
transparency, which in turn seems to be one of the motivations of the publicly available
tax expenditure information in the United States. 92 The main point is that there are
mechanisms that could either be slightly augmented or created to serve as an oversight
function. It should not be a difficult matter to test for any discriminatory effect. This
is not a novel concept. 93
86. Leo P. Martinez, Structural Impediments to Tax Reform: The Environment as Case Study,
14 FLA. TAX REV. 45, 52 (2013).
87. Id. “The JCT is a nonpartisan Congressional committee established under the 1926 Revenue
Act that alternates chairmanship between the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance
Committee. The JCT prepares revenue estimates for all tax legislation considered in Congress, analyzes
(and sometimes even drafts the statutory language) of tax proposals, investigates relevant issues in the
federal tax system, and reports back to each committee the results of their findings. Additionally,
congressional committees can seek input from relevant departments and agencies, including the
Government Accountability Office, who can provide a report on the efficiency or desirability of enacting a
given tax bill into law.” Id.
88. Id. at 53.
89. REPORT ON FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES—CONCEPTS, ESTIMATES AND EVALUATIONS
2017, https://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2017/taxexp-depfisc17-eng.pdf. Canada is not alone in taking
this approach. See Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tᴀx L. Rᴇᴠ. 187,
188 (2004) (identifying 16 countries as of 1996).
90. Id. at part 3.
91. Id.
92. Lisa Philipps, Globalization of Tax Expenditure Reporting: Transplanting Transparency
in India and the Global South, at 2–3 (2012), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/34); Professor
Philipps cites scholarship describing similar use of tax expenditure information in the United States. Id. at
3 n.11.
93. Whitford, supra note 48, at 1644 (“[t]ax policy, like other public policy . . . should take
racial effects into account in deciding on normative ideals.”); Polsky, supra note 55, at (suggesting
distributional tax expenditures should be evaluated to determine whether they make the tax system more or
less fair); Livingston, supra note 25, at 759 (advocating consideration of tax legislation for its effect on
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For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro, drawing on Richard Musgrave’s
classic text, The Theory of Public Finance, 94 has observed that tax expenditures can
be allocative, focusing on the acquisition and use of assets in our society, or
distributional, focusing on income “to determine tax liabilities or transfer receipts.” 95
It is within this distributional category that there is potential for affecting fundamental
tax fairness. 96 That said, some allocative tax expenditures can nevertheless affect
distributional equity. Professor Gregg Polsky recognizes this possibility. He writes,
“[s]ome tax expenditures [like the home mortgage deduction and tax-favored pension
plans] are commonly justified on allocative grounds, but in reality do not substantially
affect the allocation of resources in the manner intended. As a result, their impact is
mostly distributional.” 97
My point is not to quibble with traditional or progressive tax theorists, but
rather to emphasize that the examination of tax expenditures deserves attention. As
Professor Shaviro suggests, there is an unrealized potential in tax expenditure analysis
as a tool, if used with an awareness of its limitations. He explains: “[b]y adapting [tax
expenditure analysis] to use more flexible and varied measures that clarify its
relationship to underlying distributional aims and that take account of reasonable
disagreements as to those aims, we can hope to improve both its informational content
and its general background influence on budgetary and tax policy debate.” 98
Moreover, the same can be said about all scholars who work in this area. If
we are flexible in clarifying all measures with respect to distributional aims and we
account for reasonable disagreements, we will emerge with an improved tax policy
debate and consequently an improved tax policy.
This is not to suggest that discrimination, once discovered, would be easy to
address. However, how we, as a society, analyze different Code provisions could
change and that would be a good start. Of course, in any discovered (presumably
widely agreed upon) discrimination, particularly regarding Code provisions, theorists
would face the daunting task of building consensus on a specific solution. In this vein,
legislators and tax policy experts undoubtedly have a range of options. For example,
the tax expenditure analysis of a particular Code provision might encompass weighing
of discriminatory effect against its utility with respect to the greater public good. 99 Or
women and minorities); see also id. (“A tax system would be considered progressive only if it were fair to
lower-income individuals, regardless of race or gender, but also if it dealt fairly with disadvantaged groups.
Particular attention would be paid to provisions (such as joint returns and the capital gain rules) that have
disproportionate effects on disadvantaged groups.”). Even Professor Zelenak has joined this chorus.
Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1575 (suggesting a multi-step approach that begins with the inquiry as to whether
a particular Code provision was intended to have a disparate impact and whether there exists a legitimate
purpose for the provision). My contribution would be to delete intentionality. An unintentionally created
discriminatory effect is nonetheless harmful.
94. Shaviro, supra note 89, at 188–89 n.8.
95. Id.
96. Polsky, supra note 55, at 657.
97. Id. Professor Polsky’s examples, the home mortgage deduction and tax-favored pension
plans, were both studied by Professors Moran and Whitford. Moran & Whitford, supra note 16, at 774, 783.
98. Shaviro, supra note 89, at 253.
99. The public good would have to be good indeed. At some point even national policy has to
yield to basic fairness. One scholar has suggested that investment in financial assets might be one such
public good. Jensen, supra note 5, at 1761. Of course, even the Code’s seeming encouragement of capital
investment is nuanced proposition. Luzi Hail, Stephanie A. Sikes & Clare Wang, Cross-Country Evidence
on the Relation between Capital Gains Taxes, Risk, and Expected Returns (Nov. 27,
2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2404044 (arguing that an increase in capital
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a discriminatory Code provision might be tweaked so as to diminish its discriminatory
effect. Alternatively, a Code provision might be ripe for repeal with the replacement
of a more equitable Code provision. 100 In short, there cannot be, nor should there be,
one single solution for all cases. The development of a rubric to systematically deal
with individual Code provisions should not be beyond us.
D. Start From Scratch
It is tempting to suggest that we start from scratch. Many critics have
suggested that the Code is broken and that we would all be better off to scrap it and
start anew. 101 However, even with a new system, the problem would remain. 102
Seemingly neutral legislation is not always neutral, and vigilance regarding
discrimination would still be needed. Discrimination and its disparate impacts are
pervasive in American society; to expect them not to creep into the law would be
unrealistic. Without a systematic attempt to allay the disparate impacts of new
provisions, the result would be as bad, or nearly as bad, as what we have already.

CONCLUSION
Taxes make the nation-state possible. 103 A corollary is that tax systems
function to redistribute wealth. 104 This article is founded on the idea that the
distribution should be fair. That said, many still fail to appreciate the role played by
taxes in our constitutional democracy and “there is much real, exhausting work still to
be done to unmask the discriminatory bias in the tax law.” 105 Added to this mix is a
more conservative environment that can be seen as an impediment to tax reform
benefiting the poor or minorities. Thus, one can easily conclude that the future of
equitable redistribution does not seem promising. 106
Realistically, the goal may not be the complete elimination of discriminatory
Code provisions, but to at least reduce the extreme forms of such discrimination. In
this vein, the critical tax critiques are similar to the critical theory critiques generally.
The point of critical theory is that law is imbued with values, and the values it reflects
are the values of the folks who make the law: the status quo. In that sense, tax is no
different from other areas of law, the same patterns of discrimination that exist in
society generally are reflected in the Code. This idea is at the heart of any critical take
on the law, but seems especially relevant in tax, where the law maps our lives and our

gains rates does not always impair the ability to raise capital).
100. Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187, 189
n.5 (2013).
101. A consumption tax seems to be the popular alternative. The difficulty is that a
consumption tax is regressive and tends to affect low-income taxpayers adversely. Bird & Zolt, supra note
83, at 1639 (citing a South African study to the effect “that without a progressive income tax, the reliance
on the VAT and other consumption taxes would have made the entire tax system regressive”).
102. The South African study’s “key point is not that the progressivity of the income tax affects
income distribution significantly. Rather, because taxes on consumption are regressive, without the income
tax offset the tax system as a whole would be undesirably regressive.” Id.
103. Justices Holmes and Brandeis expressed a similar thought: “Taxes are what we pay for
civilized society.” Compania General de Tobacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.
& Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104. Abreu, supra note 5.
105. Brown, Fellows, Bridget, note 2
106. Livingston, supra note 25, at 738.
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society so closely. We cannot ignore the problem.
For too long, critical tax scholars have been on the defense. The time is long
past to take the offense and shift the defense to those who cling to the claim that the
Code is neutral and applies equally to all. Even for traditional defenders of the Code,
there is a need to address all of these issues. The elephant in the room can no longer
be ignored because the Code is embedded with tax provisions which have produced
discriminatory disparities against minorities—in a just and democratic system this is
simply intolerable. The time is now to address and eliminate discriminatory tax
provisions which affect us all in our constitutional democracy.

